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Markets in HE 
Neoliberalism feeds a belief in the ability of markets to 
distribute goods and services in the most effective manner 
(Brown and Carrasso 2014, Molesworth et al 2010).  
But the English HE system doesn't meet the conditions 
under which a market could work perfectly (Marginson 
2013) 
Despite this governments, in England as elsewhere, have 
nevertheless determined to make market-like interventions 
to inject competition into the system.  
Markets in HE - English policy aims 
2004 HE Act  
variable fees; market in bursaries 
2011 White Paper Student at the Heart of the 
System 
encouragement for cheaper providers 
encouragement for those with AAB+ to attend high-tariff 
institutions 
for others, encouraged to go value for money 
2015-16 removal of number cap 
'liberating number controls' 'freeing up the market' 
2016 White Paper and HE & Research Act 2017 
English policy structure (since 
2012) 
Encouragement of new providers at lower 
price points - price and quality competition 
Easier access to HE market (UT, DAP) 
Easier 'exit' for failing providers 
Uncapped numbers - demand led system 
Fee/Loans income-contingent repayment 
system underwritten by the state 
How a free market is supposed to work... 
In general terms, a market may be described 
as the means by which sellers transact with 
buyers, exchanging goods or services for an 
agreed price. Roger Brown defines it thus: 
… a means of social co-ordination whereby the 
supply and demand for a good or service are 
balanced through the price mechanism. Consumers 
choose between alternatives of offer on the basis of 
perceived suitability (price, quality, 
availability).                                                                
                   (Brown in Molesworth et al 2010:11) 
 
In the context of higher education, the existence of a 
market would be signified by: 
• freedom on the part of higher education providers to decide on their offer to student ‘consumers’ 
(disciplines and subjects, curricula, qualifications, modes of ‘delivery’);  
• freedom on the part of providers to set a price for their 
services, which takes into account the cost of 
provision and the maximisation of profit; 
• freedom of provider entry into the market without 
regulation, beyond the statutory regulations applying 
to any commercial organisation. 
(Brown in Molesworth et al 2010) 
 
Market failure: why we don't have 
perfect competition in English HE 
 
Market doesn't set the price - equilibrium 
cannot occur with a fee cap: 
- current excess of demand over supply - 
suggests fees too low 
- suggests more places should be created (or 
fees rise) 
 
 
Fixed tuition fee 
Why we don't have perfect 
competition in English HE 
1992 Further and Higher Education Act 
brought together 40 universities and 90 Polytechnics 
and HE colleges 
133 HEIs in a unitary system 
But highly differentiated by: 
... history 
... prestige 
... access policies 
... 'personality development model' which deters 
application from some groups (Gellert) 
 
Market failure 2 
• market for degrees not homogenous - as 
measured by demand (ie applicants per place 
at required entry level) 
• differentiated demand results in a potentially 
different response to a change in tuition fee 
• e.g. Russell Group could still attract 
applicants at a higher fee level.. 
• whereas if post-1992s raised their fees, 
demand would likely fall - we would have 
differentiated demand 
 
Differentiated demand 
Why is there no tuition-fee 
competition? 
There is a 'dual pricing' mechanism in this 
particular market  
Tuition fees (maximum fixed by govt) 
UCAS tariff (set by universities- created by 
the actions of supply/demand for university 
places) 
Only the tariff acts as a price in these 
conditions 
Govt wants fees to mirror tariff distribution  
Dual pricing mechanism 
£9k maximum 
£6k basic fee 
Planned average fee 
(modelling) £7.5k 
Tuition Fees 
UCAS Tariff 150 UCAS points 
400 
UCAS 
points 
Why a dual price mechanism? 
• Maximum fees of £9k were set with an 
assumption of an average fee of £7.5k 
• But average fees are higher than £7.5 (£8.6k) 
thus making loan repayment system too 
expensive 
• AAB+ and extra places for those charging 
less than £7.5k were designed to open up a 
gap between the high tariff and low tariff 
institutions 
• Thus dragging down the average fee by 
increasing supply 
But that hasn't emerged yet - so.... 
• 2016 White Paper Success as a Knowledge 
Economy: Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility 
and Student Choice (BIS 2016) (HERA 2017) 
– TEF 
– Degree Awarding Powers (DAP) 
– University Title rights (UT)  
– Easier market entry for providers with lower 
student numbers & lower proportions of HE 
students (of total students) 
– Crucially, make it easier for existing HEIs to fail if 
they lose out to better or cheaper providers 
– overall should drag average fees down 
Policy aims revisited: a fragmented 
market? 
Enabling failure, encouraging competition at 
bottom end 
Thus creating a parallel dual price of fee and 
tariff:  
400 pts = £9k (quality); 150 pts = £6k (value) 
Original providers will retain tariff and max 
fee of £9k  
New entrant providers will accept lower tariff 
and charge c£6k in the short term. 
The Fragmented market 
Summary 
• Policy to create a differentiated dual-price mechanism 
market so consumers can instantly see the difference 
between 9k, 7.5k and 6k institution 
• High-tariff institutions will be more easily differentiated 
from the mass 
• Applicants from poorer backgrounds and other 
marginal applicants more likely to be attracted to lower 
price / lower tariff institutions, thus damaging for 
widening participation, fair access and social mobility 
• Policy rhetoric of ‘freeing’ of the market is about 
reducing the pressure of loan servicing by the taxpayer than creating a ‘freer market’ per se: if this 
was the case they would take off the tuition fee cap. 
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